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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G. T. RUMMEL, l\L M. HARDIN, 
MATHEW P. ROWE and ROY 
M. EIDAL, doing business as 
LA SALLE MINING COM-
pANY, a partnership, 
Appellants (Plaintiffs) 
-vs.-
K. R. BAILEY, JR., and JOLENE 
BAILEY, husband and wife; 
E. J. HALL and RUTH HALL, 
husband and wife; MILTON C. 
NIELSON and ESTELLA NIEL- ) 
SON, husband and wife; F. G. 
1 
McFARLAND and S. R. HUL-
LINGER, 
Respondents (Defendarnts ). 
Case 
No. 8622 
Reply Brief of Appellants 
Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court 
in and for San Juan County, Utah. 
INTRODUCTORY 
While Respondents (hereinafter referred to as ''de-
fendants") state that in general they agree with the state-
ment of facts made by Appellants (hereinafter referred 
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to as "plaintiffs") in their Opening Brief, it will be nec-
essary, in view of certain statements made by defend-
ants, to make reference in this reply brief to certain facts 
and testimony as the same were developed at the trial. 
The fundamental issues in this case are clearly 
drawn. It is the contention of plaintiffs that the trial 
court erred in failing to recognize and apply well estab-
lished law as to what constitutes a valid discovery on a 
lode mining claim. Statements by the trial court (R. 94, 
853, 932) demonstrate, as do its findings and judgment 
in the light of the record, that the trial court felt that the 
established law of discovery does not apply to uranium 
deposits where the mineralization is frequently, as in this 
case, found at depth in unexposed formations and in 
respect to which there are no mineralized fissures or 
lodes which offer a lead to be followed. 
It is not controverted that discovery under such cir-
cumstances presents problems and difficulties. It is con-
troverted that the existence of such difficulties affords any 
basis for the disregard of the statutory requirement of 
discovery. This problem is not fundamentally different 
from that which existed-in the·-~;k-i!ig_~Q_f__dG~ov_ecy~~P. 
placer petroleum ~i~·i;~-~h-~~~ ~~i_~;-to the--enactment of 
-· - -· .. ·--·--
the Mineral Leasing Ac~t of February 25, 1920 ( 41 Stat. 
437 r, the ~ining laws __ ~y_e:re applicable to. theJQ_Q~t~<:m of 
claimsf()_:f.~il-~ gas. Oil and gas anticlines were drilled 
where there was ~ce existence of structure forming 
a reasonable basis for exploratory drilling but the law. 
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nonetheless, required discovery and conditions favorable 
to exploration were no substitute for discovery. 
Exploratory drilling has been performed and is pres-
ently, throughout the Colorado Plateau area, being per-
formed on uranium claims where reasonable justification 
for the drilling may be found in geological orientation 
and in results of exploration outside of and beyond the 
mining claim. But it does not follow that the necessity 
-· - .,...,,~·~•"'""'""'·""'""_ ..... ....,.._ ... ,_~, .. - .. .--·- . -- - . • ' 
of discovery has been dispensed with. 
----·· ----~-------------·--··--4-
An ~ss~~tial_e]~JD.ent of discovery is expectation of 
finding a pay or co!!!!!!erQ!!-!1. mineral deposit l:m.t to con-
stitute dis·c~~~;Y __ !._~~ m~st_!>~---~--P..Il(}ing within limits 
of the claim of mineral or mineral bearing r<:>~~~ ~~-~.fur­
ther exploration o:f which so found mineral deposit 
- ----- ---- -- -
would justify further expenditure of time and money in 
.,;,.._. " . . . -. . " ...... ~ -~· ..... - ' .. 
the reasonable expectation that the pursuit and following 
of that which-wa8''¥otl"~d would lead '"to' pay--·or.· 'commer-
cial.ore. 
In a determination of whether a particular mining 
claim or a conflicting mining claim has prior validity, the 
time and the place of discovery are vital. He who asserts 
discovery should be able to say what he found, where he 
found it and when he found it. In the case at bar, de-
fendants say that they observed a sandstone lens in the 
area - a sandstone lens which evidences no more miner-
alization than the soil in the yard at the courthouse where 
this case was tried. Defendants did nothing to explore 
that ''sandstone lens.'' No one anywhere in the vicinity 
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had done so. It had no value. It led to nothing. It meant 
nothing other than as it may have meant to someone fa-
miliar with geology that the ore productive Shinarump 
formation was some hundreds of feet below. 
Defendants were required to show that they made a 
valid discovery on their respective mining claims prior 
to July 24, 1953. They failed to do so. The finding by 
the trial court that plaintiffs' locations were wholly 
invalid because they bore a date in advance of their 
actual posting, wholly disregards the facts that: 
An Amended ~ otice of Location, dated Octo-
ber 1, 1953, was, on that date, posted by plaintiffs 
on their Red Canyon X o. 6 claim; 
An Amended Notice of Location, dated Octo-
ber 3, 1953, was, on that date, posted by plaintiffs 
on their Red Canyon No. 9 claim; 
Notices of Lease Application, dated May 21, 
1954, were on said date posted on plaintiffs' claims 
pursuant to the provisions of .AEC Circular 7 (10 
CFR 60.7) with respect to which a timely filing of 
a Lease Application with AEC was made by plain-
tiffs on June 25, 1954; and 
On September 1, 1954, plaintiffs posted on 
each of their claims an Amended Notice of Loca-
tion ''for the purpose of correcting any errors in 
the original location, description or record, or va-
lidity • * •, and for the purpose of obtaining the 
benefits" of Public Law 585 ( 68 Stat. 708; 30 
USCA 501). 
Reply will be made to defendants' points in the order 
in which they are discussed in Respondents' Brief. 
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I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT A VALID DISCOVERY HAD BEEN 
MADE ON DEFENDANTS' MAYBE NOS. 
1, 2, 3, 4 AND RED FRY NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4 
CLAIMS OR ON ANY OF THEM PRIOR 
TO JULY 24, 1953. 
This error by the trial court is discussed in part in 
Appellants' Opening Brief (pp. 33-39). The federal min-
ing law expressly declares: 
'' * * * no location of a mining claim shall be made 
until the discovery of the vein or lode within the 
limits of the claim located." ( 30 USCA 23) 
Identical language is found in the Utah statutes (UCA 
1953, 40-1-1). 
In recognition of these statutes, this Court in 
Pitcher v. Jones, 71 Utah 453, 457; 267 P. 184, said: 
''It, of course, is well settled that it is essen-
tial to the validity of a mining location, or lode 
claim, that there be a discovery of mineral in place 
within the limits of the claim." 
To the same effect is Gibbons v. Frazier, 68 Utah 182, 
184; 249 P. 472. 
In Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286; 40 S. Ct. 321, 326, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
''In practice discovery usually precedes loca-
tion, and the statute treats it as the initial act. 
But in the absence of an intervening right it is no 
objection that the usual and statutory order is re-
5 
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versed. In such a case the location becomes effee-
tive from the date of discovery; but in the presence 
of an intervening right it must remain of no 
effect.'' 
Against the background of the foregoing short state-
ment of the pertinent and applicable statutes and deci-
sions, we shall undertake to analyze the facts which the 
defendants rely upon as constituting a compliance with 
the law requiring the discovery of mineral in place within 
the geographical limits of each of their claims prior to 
July 24, 1953, the date the oil and gas application was 
filed. This date is controlling as we have established in 
our Opening Brief and as we shall further demonstrate in 
this brief. July 24, 1953, is the date before which any 
discovery must have been made to be of avail to 
defendants. 
Defendants rely in the main upon the testimony of 
defendant Milton C. Nielson. At page 7 of Respondents' 
Brief, they say that this defendant had been familiar 
with the area and that prior to 1953 he had observed the 
channelling and mineralization in the area of Red and Fry 
Canyons. The record (page 522) shows he had prospected 
the area prior to 1953. His observations at that time must 
not have impressed him for he did not then stake any 
claims in the area although he was there for the purpose 
of prospecting (R. 523, line 2). At page 7 of their brief, 
defendants apparently seek to show that, at the time of 
staking the claims involved in this action, defendant Niel-
son was on defendants' claims with a geiger counter. How-
ever, a reading of the reeord at lines 10 to 30, page 524, 
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shows that defendant Nielson did not know when he was 
in the conflict area with a geiger counter. 
This defendant said he saw "a little bit of minerali-
zation, black copper, I call it." (R. 524) While not so 
stated in Respondents' Brief, the witness was testifying 
to an observation which he claimed to have made prior 
to 1953 (see lines 20-30, R. 523). In addition to the fore-
going, defendant Nielson testified that he saw a ''sand-
stone lens.'' At page 9 of Respondents' Brief, the state-
ment is made (supposedly supported by a reference to 
page 535 of the record) that defendant Nielson staked 
additional claims ''based upon the mineralization and the 
copper showing on the contact of the Moenkopi and 
Shinarump.'' This statement that the claims were 
located "based upon the mineralization and copper 
showing" is a conclusion of the writers of Respondents' 
Brief and is a statement not found in or in any way sup-
ported by the record at page· 535 thereof or elsewhere. 
It is interesting to note that defendant Nielson 
asserts that he staked part of the claims on one day and 
that, on the next day, he returned and staked more claims. 
This defendant signed a payroll record certifying that 
he had worked full time for a construction company 
(R. 551-553) on each of said two days. 
We submit that the foregoing is the only testimony 
relating to discovery given by defendant Nielson who 
located defendants' claims. He did not say and could not 
say where on any or even on what claims he saw the 
asserted mineralization or a sandstone lens. At the tak-
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ing of the deposition of this defendant, he freely and 
unequivocally stated under oath that he had made no dis-
covery of Gre on any of the claims of defendants involved 
in this litigation (Nielson deposition, p. 15, lines 6-8). 
At pages 10 and 11 of their brief, defendants state 
that defendant Nielson in fact made a discovery on Maybe 
No.2 and on Maybe No.3. For this conclusion defendants 
cite pages 560 and 561 of the record. An impartial read-
ing of the record discloses that, when asked at his deposi-
tion if he made any discovery of ore on any of these 
claims, defendant Nielson answered in the negative. By 
trial time, however, he had been educated to the necessity 
of having made a discovery. Then for the first time and 
after having to admit that he had stated that he had 
made no discovery on any of defendants' claims, Nielson 
came up with the convenient excuse that what he had 
meant was that he had made a discovery a.t some indeter-
minate but earlier date. That, we submit, is an escape 
effort which is either, on the one hand, unworthy of belief 
or is, on the other, so vague that it is of no probative 
value. Had this man honestly considered that he had 
made a discovery at any time he would have so stated in 
his deposition. 
Defendant E. J. Hall is referred to on page 12 of 
Respondents' Brief as having observed mineralization on 
Red Fry No. 3 and ~fay be Nos. 3 and 4. The record must 
again be read for a correct and factual understanding 
(R. 445). What defendant Hall testified as having seen 
was "stains and what it looked like to me as mineralized 
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sandstone.'' These were not leads .i<L 3.Jlything and de-
.,.._...., . ..----.-___._..---.. --
fendants did not follow them. Hall did not say on what 
parr of any particular claim or even on what claim or 
claims he made any such observation. 
Defendant Bailey is also quoted in the brief as stat-
ing that he examined the sandstone rim with a scintillator 
and got a count (R. 604-605). He did not say what the 
count was. He did not say on what part of any particular 
claim he got a count or even what claim or claims he was 
on. His testimony also must be read in the light of his 
deposition, at the time of the taking of which he could not 
even state at wliat time in 1953 he had been in the area. 
The foregoing is all the evidence as to defendants' 
alleged discovery prior to July 24, 1953. The balance of 
defendants' testimony on discovery is that of parties 
who were employed by them to examine the property in 
connection with defendants' preparation for the trial of 
this suit and, of course, has no bearing on the factual 
situation as the same existed prior to July 24, 1953. 
Defendants urge upon this Court the adoption of 
what defendants refer to as a "liberal" interpretation of 
the law, i. e., a liberal interpretation of the mining 
statutes of the United States and of the State of Utah 
cited above. Plaintiffs submit that defendants are in 
~•''"_,.,......,,_.,...._. • ·-·~·-·--•••-•~·w·•·• 
fact urging disr~.g_~.;rd __ of._the_ .. r.equir.eme.nt .. -::of -~discovery 
wni:~isth~-;~ry ~~~~~~!-~?~ .. ?.!. ... !~~--~~~~~[Jaws. Defend-
ants did nothing but observe a sandstone lens in the gen-
eral vicinity of the claims and saw (where is not shown) 
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what they considered to be mineralization and black 
copper. 
It must be borne in mind that the surfaces of the 
area looked at by defendants Bailey, Hall and Nielson 
were not in the ore horizons of the Shinarump whence 
all of the ore production in the area has come. Such sur-
faces were on top of the barren Mossback (a member of 
the upper Chinle formation) whence no production has 
ever come. 
The basis of defendants' argument for a "liberal" 
theory of the law is that a locator may, by the observa-
tion of geology and by geological orientation (as distin-
guished from the finding of ore in place) be led to locate 
a claim and, therefore, that he has made a discovery 
before he actually finds mineral in place. The observa-
tion of these defendants was of surface geology many 
hundreds of feet above the ore horizon. No fissures exist 
in the area where the alleged observations were made 
which argumentatively could have permitted an inter-
change of mineralization and a deposition of ore or the 
following of a mineralized fissure to ore. ~~~ 
found nothing and followed nothi~g_ ~_!1-J~_!l i!!_~uced the~ 
to spend either--s-ubsequent time or money in pursuit of 
any alTegeciTei<f Rather, they f~Ik;;;d th~-~~-~-~~;~-f the 
driTH~g instituted by .the.ANC..ancLno .drill .holes. . .:which 
-....;:::_._ ··- -----· ·- --· ..... 
showed ore were comple_t.e.d _on any of the. claims in ques-
tion~~!i_l ___ ~ft~r A ~g~st 17, 1953. (Testimony of Hyrum 
B. Woods, AEC geologist in charge of drilling, as set 
forth on pages 169 to 214 of the record.) 
10 
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The testimony shows that nowhere in the vicinity of 
- . ···--·····- ~ ... 
the claims in question h~~ _ _?re, commercial or non-com-
merCi!il, been found i11 t_ll~ Mossback or in the so-called 
''sandstone lens'' {U:Ht.that prospecting in those horizons 
offered no prospect of success. Of course, defendants 
did not start or pursue any work on these horizons - no 
reasonable person would have. 
The fact that these defendants did not see nor find 
anything which they could have followed or did follow 
to a finding of ore destroys their argument, for even as 
to the minority "liberal viewpoint" the "touchstone" of 
the "broad interpretation" is that the claimant has found 
what" he could follow, expecting to find ore" (Resp. Br. 
22). A valid discovery cannot be Q~sed U:QQ_~_g~_Q_logical 
inf erence-~~_!~_R~-~~~~~:-~i~~:i~~?~-~! depth of_-~- _p()!en tial 
ore horizon which has no connection whatever with what 
wa.s-rOuild other t?~I~~rin nature's masonry it was laid 
d~wn geologic __ ~g-~_s_ before the surface, ... .and ___ barren, 
Mossback. 
W. D. McDougald, an independent geologist, of 
Moab, Utah, a graduate of the University of Utah with 
Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in 
geology, testified he examined the area in question on 
three occasions - once with Ken Millard and H. G. 
Brown, once with Frank H. MacPherson and once with 
Dr. Leland W. Stokes. Samples were taken from the 
exposed material at the same points from which defend-
ants caused samples to be take~ (R. 890). We must as-
,,. 
sume that defendants selected for sampling the points 
11 
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they considered most likely to show mineralization. These 
samples were subjected to chemical assay and no copper 
was found. There being no copper there for defendant 
Nielson to have observed, he could not possibly have seen 
any copper, either black or any other color, at these points 
which defendants, not plaintiffs, selected for sampling. 
Moreover, the chemical assays of the eleven samples so 
taken range between 0.002 and 0.013 of one percent U 30 8, 
less than the geiger counter indicated in the court house 
lawn. 
Frank H. MacPherson, a graduate and experienced 
engineer (R. 921-3), t~stified (R. 932-5) that a_prudent 
miner~udd not spe~d money 4~i~g--~~lQ!1!.tiQ!t_Work 
with the hope of ~-~veloping an ~re body on the_ ba~~s of 
whatw~;;n in the formation from which these 
samj)fes-were ... taken·.~· ....... ~~~-·~~·--··~-~--------· --
--~.--·. 
Dr. Leland W. Stokes, head of the Department of 
Geology of the University of Utah and an outstanding 
expert, particularly in the field of uranium, testified that 
in his examination of the conflict area he found no visible 
uranium or signs or uranium mineralization and that no 
-reas<!_:r:_~~}~--~in~.r or prudenLman would ha~e..spent any 
time or money in pursuing .. ~~Y.~_:QQ:wing in th~--~-~d-~t()ne 
-·------· ·-
lens above the Ivfossback (R. 943, 945). His statement is 
completely consistent with what defendants • actually did, 
for they did nothing in respect to pursuing anything they 
found in the Mossback. He stated that there was no min-
eralization relationship between the Mossback and the 
Shinarump formation. He further testified that there is 
12 
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about 300 feet of very dense rock of varying kinds be-
tween the Mossback surface and the Shinarump in which 
the ore body was found by the AEC in its drilling (R. 
946). Dr. Stokes testified that there was no possibility of 
the lower ore body influencing or being responsible for a 
higher ore body- that the Mossback is part of the Chinle 
formation and that he knew of no prodUC'tion from the 
Chinle formation in the White Canyon area. In reference 
to the channelling of which defendants speak, Dr. Stokes 
described the nature of channels or ancient stream beds 
and -stated that th~---~h~~~ei-i~--th·~~ Mo~~~b;~k-·t~;,~~·rsed 
. ·------- -···-··- "----··------.---- ----- --
the area fn._a later._geoio.gic. age, !'-.8.:!l._.~_La different Jtngle 
andlla<rn.e>r-efatio'ii~-!ifp-.t~---and wa~. ~influ~11ced by the or;-p~;d~~t-i;·~-·--~h~nnel i!l. the deep~lying and earlier 
----------- .. --
Shinarump formation . 
......._____ __ .---·-··· 
The conclusion of the writers of defendants' brief 
(Resp. Br. 19) that Dr. Stokes testified or expressed the 
opinion that the Mi Vida property was not worth locating 
finds no support in the record. 
Th~~.sibility._of making a discovery may jus-
tify exploration in search of a discovery is no more a sub-
stitufe.t"or discove.ryo·n·a uraniuiii-cfaim than 18 the exis-
tence-- of a f~~~·~~bi~ ~ntieli~~' ·~ll-i~h---;arra~t~··-·d~illing, 
·-....... '"""'",_-_. • •••• • • •··-•••••••••"" ~-• -••·r~•••• •·••• •• 
equivalent to an oil discovery. 
Lindley, in his work On Mines, 3rd Ed., Volume 2, 
section 437, p. 1026, makes the following statement: 
''Of course, exploitation on adjacent lands 
might raise a strong presumption that a given 
tract contained petroleum. An oil-producing well 
13 
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within each of four sections of land surrounding 
a fifth would produce a conviction that the oil de-
posit was underneath the fifth section. This fact 
might justify the land department in classifying 
the section in the category of mineral lands, or the 
government surveyor in returning it as such, but 
it would not dispense with the necessity of making 
a discovery.'' (Citing cases.) 
In Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U. S. 85; 32 S. Ct. 187, 
188 ( 1912), the court said : 
"Discovery without the limits of the claim, no 
matter what its proximity, does not suffice." 
Six pages of Respondents' Brief (pp. 21-26) repre-
sent a quotation from an article appearing in 27 Rocky 
Mountain Law Review 404. Such quotation constitutes 
that author's discussion of what he refers to as the "lib-
eral view.'' In introducing his discussion, the author 
states ( p. 408) : 
"Two main lines of authority stand out in the 
body of decisions relating to determination of dis-
covery. They diverge with regard to whether 
indications of mineral can suffice for a discoYery 
in lieu of the actual presence of mineral.'' 
In the paragraph which follows the foregoing quotation 
and precedes that with which defendants' quotation com-
mences (p. 408), ·the author with complete frankness 
states: 
''The preponderance of decisions hold that 
mere indications of mineral, however strong, can-
not take the place of discovery of mineral itself.'' 
(Citing 16 cases of which 4 are decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court.) 
14 
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Following the discussion quoted by defendants, the 
author of the article again frankly states: 
''As stated before, however, numerical weight 
of authority seems to hold that actual mineral in 
place must be revealed, and whether such revela-
tion may be by means other than the sense of sight 
is not clear.'' ( p. 413) 
Reference to the authorities cited for the so-called 
"liberal view" will indicate that such weight of author-
ity does not depend upon numbers alone. Not a single 
decision by the United States Supreme Court is cited for 
the "liberal view." Two pages of the quotation (Resp. 
Br. 24-26) represent discussions of or quotations from 
two decisions by the Director of the Bureau of Land 
Management. 
Let us refer to two decisions by the Secretary of 
the Interior Department, who, on appeal, reviews de-
cisions by the Director of the Bureau of Land 
l\1anagement. 
In the case of Oregon Basin Oil and Gas Co., 50 L.D. 
253 (1924), it is stated: 
"The Department is aware of n2_ decision 
wherein, citing the rule announced in Castle v.· 
Womble, it has ever taken into consideration the 
proyen' pres~-~.c-~.-~it~i!l JP:~. limits or.~~ ·~ng 
claim. of deposits not actually and pgysic::tllY ·_ex-
po~ed·therein as a groUild for sustaining_fh~ _suf-
ficieiicy oi'in'· asserted discovery based UP()!l the 
expo-sure-within the limits of the_ c~~im of !t. <Jeposit 
tharciTd no't 'warrant or justify the expenditure of 
time and money _'\Vi.tli a·reaso-riabie prospect of 
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succ~the _<}~y~J_()_p!!l~J;!t -~L~-y~J·~~ble mine on 
the particular deposit so exposed. * * * (255) 
''If any doubt ever existed as to the meaning 
of the Castle v. Womble rule, that doubt was re-
moved by the decision in Jefferson-Montana Cop-
per Mines Company which specifically points out 
that the particular deposit actually discovered 
within the limits of a mining claim is the one for 
the reasonable prospect of the development of 
which into a valuable mine the further expenditure 
of time and money must be shown to have been 
warranted by the evidence." (256) 
In United States v. ArizoM Manganese Corp., 57 
I.D. 558 (1942), it is stated: 
''The geologists who have been in charge of 
the development work and the mineral expert for 
the Government agree in the belief that the man-
ganiferous beds underlie all of the claims in ques-
tion. The reason for this belief, as expressed by 
the defendants' witnesses, appears to be that the 
various drill holes and outcrops in which manga-
nese is found, considering their position with rela-
tion to each other and the claims in question, the 
similarity in the formation in which the manga-
nese is found, the occurrence of the mineral in the 
same geologic horizons and other geologic eYi-
dence, strongly indicate the continuity and lateral 
extent of the deposit and the probability, as to 
most of the claims and the possibility as to a few, 
that all the claims in question are underlain by the 
beds of maganiferous deposits that haYe actually 
been discovered. • • • 
"It was contended in the appeal to the Com-
missioner, and is contended here, in effect, that 
the geological proof is so strong as to the existence 
of manganiferous beds under the claims in ques-
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tion that it would be a waste of money to require 
discovery by drilling on each contested claim; that 
manganese is a strategic mineral and the Bureau 
of Mines and the Geological Survey are interested 
in developing a large and adequate domestic re-
serve of such mineral to provide for national de-
fense needs in the present emergency; that large 
expenditures necessary to establish a plant to de-
velop the property are not justified unless title is 
obtained to the entire compact and contiguous 
area and therefore the technical rule of actual dis-
covery on the claim should be waived by the De-
partment as it did in the Rough Rider case ( 42 
L.D. 584) when there was no national emergency 
or other compelling reason. 
''The Commissioner held that: 
A discovery of mineral is an essential of 
the first importance ; regardless of any emer-
gency that may exist it is a requirement that 
this office has no authority to waive. Section 
2320 R. S. (30 U.S. C. 23), provides that 'no 
location of a mining claim shall be made until 
the discovery of the vein or lode within the 
limits of the claims located.' 
''The rule that no lode mining claim can be 
located and no patent issued until the actual dis-
covery of a vein or lode within the limits of the 
claim as located and that mere indications or 
belief in the existence of mineral on the claim do 
not amount to a discovery, is well settled. See 30 
U.S.C.A. sec. 23, note 124, and cases cited in Rough 
Rider and Other Lode Claims, 41 L.D. 242, 253, 
254; East Tintic Consolidated Mining Co., 41 L.D. 
255; Oregon Basin Oil and Gas Comp01ny, 50 L.D. 
244 ; id. 258 ; Lindley on Mines, (3d ed.) sec. 437. 
Also a discovery outside the location no matter 
what its proximity to the lines of the claim is not 
17 
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a discovery thereon. Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 
85, 91. The case of Rough Rider and Other Lode 
Claims ( 42 L.D. 584), has plainly no application 
to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the case is 
no longer followed. Gonzales v. Stewart, 46 L.D. 
85. If it can be shown that the prompt acquisition 
of title to these claims by the claimants, without 
compliance with the law as to discovery, would 
expedite the accumulation of manganese resources 
for the purpose of national defense, that showing 
might constitute an appropriate basis for congres-
sional legislation. The Department is without au-
thority to disregard the law for such reasons. The 
Commissioner was right in holding invalid the 
claims upon which no actual and physical exposure 
of manganese has been made.'' ( 559-560) 
Defendants use two pages of their brief (Resp. Br. 
26-28) to quote from a law student Xote appearing in 
9 Wyoming La;w Journal 214. In the quotation used by 
defendants, the author refers to geological information 
and to radio-activity readings. It may be pointed out that 
in the article the author also said: 
''An informed guess based on geological e·d-
dence indicating the likelihood of discovery is not 
sufficient in the absence of a.n actual discovery of 
minerals within the confines of the claim.'' ( p. 215) 
In respect to radiometric readings, the author says: 
"However, consideration must be giYen to the 
fact that elements other than uranium are radio-
active. In addition, these instruments are subject 
to failure due to defectiYe batteries, malfunction 
of the mechanism due to rough or improper han-
dling in the field and subjection of the instrument 
to extreme humidity or cold. • • • HoweYer, in 
view of the uncertainties described above it is be-
18 
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lieved that additional evidence would be required 
to establish a valid discovery." (p. 218) 
It may also be pointed out that in the same paragraph 
and in the sentence which precedes the quotation used by 
1'"\ 
defendants commencing on the last paragraph of page 27 
of defendants' brief, the author whom they quote stated: 
''Information which is of a general nature is 
not sufficient to support a claim of discovery. 
Thus, the testimony of four witnesses that a dis-
covery complied with the meaning of the standard 
was ineffective and failed to establish that a valid 
discovery had been made.'' ( p. 216) 
Defendants (Resp. Br. 33-38), with no supporting 
authorities whatsoever, dispute the proposition that 
prior to enactment on August 13, 1954, of Public Law 
585 ( 68 Stat. 708; 30 USCA 521), a valid mining claim 
could not be located on land embraced within an issued 
oil and gas lease or embraced within a pending applica-
tion for an oil and gas lease under the Mineral Leasing 
Act of February 25, 1920 ( 41 Stat. 437; 30 USCA 
181 ff.). 
We quote from the decision of the Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior in J ebson et al. v. Spencer 
et al., 61 I. D. 161, 163-164). 
''The first question for consideration is 
whether the land was subject to mining location on 
February 2, 1940, when the discovery of minerals 
is claimed to have been made by the contestants. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
''Prior to the passage of the leasing acts, in-
cluding the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 
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1920, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belong-
ing to the United States were open to exploration 
and purchase, and the lands in which they were 
found were open to occupation and purchase under 
the provisions of the mining laws (30 U.S.C., 1946 
ed., sec. 21 et seq.). The leasing acts inaugurated 
an entirely new system with respect to the dispo-
sition of lands containing the deposits dealt with 
in those acts. The Mineral Leasing Act provided 
that, with the exception of valid claims existing on 
February 25, 1920, deposits of oil and gas and 
lands containing such deposits should be subject 
to disposition only in the form and manner pro-
vided therein (30 U. S. C., 1946 ed., sees. 181 and 
193). 
''Shortly after the passage of the Mineral 
Leasing Act, the Department held that there could 
be no room for the contemporaneous operation of 
the mining laws and the Mineral Leasing Act with 
respect to the same lands ; and that if an attempt 
were made, after the enactment of the Mineral 
Leasing Act, to locate a mining claim on land cov-
ered by an outstanding permit or lease issued 
under the act or known at the time of the attempt-
ed location to be valuable for any of the minerals 
mentioned in the :Mineral Leasing Art, the De-
partment would not recognize the attempted loca-
tion. See Joseph E. McClory ef al., 50 L. D. 623 
(1924); letter dated October 9, 1924, from Secre-
tary Work to Congressman Richards, 50 L. D. 
650 (1924). The Department has maintained its 
position in this respect over the years. See United 
States v. United States Borax Company, 58 I.D. 
426, 432 (1943). The Department has also held 
that the filing of an allowable application for an 
oil and gas prospecting permit or for a noncom-
petitive oil and gas lease has a segregative effect 
on the land applied for and confers upon the appli-
cant a priority of right over any adverse interest 
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thereafter sought to be initiated. Filtrol Company 
v. Brittarn a;nd Echart, 51 L.D. 649 (1926); Mono-
lith Portland Cement Company et al., 61 I.D. 43 
(1952). 
The Interior Department decisions in R. L. Greene 
et al., A-27181 (1955), Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc., 
A-27287 (1956) and Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc., 64 
I. D. 210 ( 1957), are to the same effect. 
The R. L. Greene et al. case involved two mining 
claims, one of which covered lands which at the time of 
the location were included within a pending application 
for an oil and gas lease which was subsequently issued. 
The other mining claim covered lands which at the time 
of location were included in an outstanding oil and gas 
lease. After stating the rule of J ebson et al. v. Spencer 
et al., above referred to, the Solicitor, in his decision of 
May 11, 1955, stated: 
''Thus, in the present case, the two claims 
were located at a time when the land embraced in 
the claims was not open to mineral location. The 
claims therefore have no validity. 
''While these holdings of the Department 
have apparently never been considered by the 
courts, the position taken by the Department has, 
in effect, been affirmed by two recent acts of 
Congress. 
"By the act of August 12, 1953 [Public Law 
250] (30 U.S. C., 1952 ed., Supp. I, sees. 501-505 ), 
Congress provided, among other things, that any 
mining claim located under the mining laws of the 
United States subsequent to July 31, 1939, and 
prior to January 1, 1953, on lands of the United 
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States which were at the time of such location in-
cluded in a lease issued under the Mineral Leasing 
Act or covered by an application for such a lease 
should be effective to the same extent as if such 
mining claim had been located on lands which 
were at the time of such location subject to loca-
tion under the mining laws of the United States. 
The act required, however, that in order to obtain 
the benefits of the act the owner of any such min-
ing claim must, not later than 120 days after 
August 12, 1953, post on such claim and file for 
record in the office where the notice of location 
of such claim was of record an amended notice of 
location of such claim, stating that such notice 
was filed pursuant to the provisions of the act and 
for the purpose of obtaining the benefits thereof. 
The act provided further that any mining claim 
given force and effect under the act shall be sub-
ject to the reservation to the United States of all 
minerals subject to disposition under the Mineral 
Leasing Act. 
"A year later, on August 13, 1954, Congress 
passed another act [Public Law 585] ( 68 Stat. 
708) under the terms of which mining claims may, 
thereafter, be loc.ated on lands of the United 
States which are at the time of location included 
in leases issued under the Mineral Leasing Act 
or co\·ered by applic-ations for leases under that 
act. The act of August 13, 1954, further repeated 
the substance of the ad of ~\ugust 12, 1953, and 
provided that in order to be entitled to the bene-
fits thereof the owners of mining claims located 
on such lands subsequent to July 31, 1939, and 
prior to January 1, 1953, must haYe posted on 
the claims and filed for record within the time 
allowed by the act of August 12, 1953, amended 
no1 i<'t>s of location, stating that such notices were 
filed pursuant to the provisions of the 1953 act 
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and for the purpose of obtaining the benefits 
thereof.'' 
The Law Review article (28 So. Calif. Law Review 
147) referred to by defendants (Resp. Br. 34) not only 
does not dispute this proposition, it supports it. The 
author states (p. 148) : 
"Since rights under a valid mining location 
were rights of present and exclusive possession 
which could ripen into full title and since the Gen-
eral Mining Laws did not contemplate anything 
less, a valid mining claim and a valid prospecting 
permit or lease could not exist at the same time 
on the same land.'' 
The statement quoted from this article by defend-
ants (Resp. Br. 34-35) had absolutely no reference to 
the effect of an application for an oil and gas lease or an 
issued oil and gas lease as precluding a mining loca-
tion. It had reference only to the completely independ-
ent question of whether or not a mining location could 
be made on lands "known to be valuable for leasing act 
minerals'' in respect fo which lands there was no pend-
ing application or outstanding permit or lease. 
Defendants' assertion that a pending application 
or issued oil and gas lease did not preclude the making 
of a valid mining location, prior to the enactment of 
Public Law 585, is not only unsubstantiated but cannot 
be substantiated by any citation of authority. 
Clearly unsubstantiated and contrary to authority 
is defendants' correlative assertion (Resp. Br. 35) that: 
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'' • • • the mere filing of an application should 
give no right to the applicant other than priority 
between oil and gas lease claimants.'' 
This assertion like its companion argument above dis-
cussed is contrary to consistent rulings of the Interior 
Department. 
In the case of Monolith PortlO!ild Cement Company 
et al. v. J. R. Gillbergh et al., 61 I. D. 43, 48-49 (1952), it 
is stated: 
"Moreover, it is clear that rights under the 
mining laws cannot be acquired in a tract of public 
land after the filing and during the pendency of a 
proper application for a noncompetitive oil and 
gas lease on such land. Although' the mere filing 
of a proper application for a noncompetitive oil 
and gas lease on a tract of public land does not 
obtain for the applic-ant a -vested right to a lease, 
the person first submitting a proper application 
does acquire an inceptive or inchoate right to be 
offered a lease on the land before a lease is offered 
to a subsequent applicant, if it is decided by the 
Secretary of the Interior (or his delegate), in the 
exercise of his discretion, that the land will be 
made available for oil and gas development, if it 
is decided that the land is not within any known 
geological structure of a producing oil or gas field, 
and if it is decided that the applicant is qualified to 
obtain and hold a lease on the land. (See Warwick 
llf. Downing, A-25798, .A.ugust 16, 1950, 60 I.D. 433: 
Bettie H. Rtid ef ano., A-26330, February 4, 1952, 
61 I.D. 1.) The inceptiYe rights of the senior a.ppli-
rant for a noncompetitiYe oil and gas lease on a 
particular tract of public land tnust be protected 
pending a determination as to whether the land 
wilJ be made available f~r oil and gas develop-
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ment, as to whether the land applied for is within 
the known geological structure of a producing oil 
or gas field, and as to whether the applicant is 
qualified to hold the lease for which he has applied. 
For this reason, rights cannot be acquired under 
the mining laws in land that is covered by a pend-
ing proper application for a noncompetitive oil 
and gas lease, since such rights would be incom-
patible with the rights of an oil and gas lessee if 
the applicant's inchoate or inceptive right should 
ripen into an oil and gas lease." 
As to Interior Department decisions the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Hastings & Co. v. Whitney, 
132 U. S. 357, 366; 10 S. Ct. 112 (1889), said: 
"It is true that the decisions of the Land De-
partment on matters of law are not binding upon 
this court, in any sense. But on questions similar 
to the one involved in this case they are entitled 
to great respect at the hands of any court. In 
United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763, this 
court said: 'The construction given to a statute 
by those charged with the duty of executing it is 
always entitled to the most respectful considera-
tion, and ought not to be overruled without cogent 
reasons.'' 
The Supreme Court of Utah likewise so held in Lavag:.. 
nino v. Uhlig, 26 Utah 1, 71 P. 1046, 1049 (1903). 
Defendants' argument demonstrates that they 
wholly fail to realize that it was not any misconception 
that an oil and gas lease included rights as to minerals 
other than oil and gas which rendered wholly incompati-
ble the coexistence of rights under the Mineral Leasing 
Act and rights under the General Mining Laws; it was, 
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rather, the fact that a valid mining claim carried rights 
as to all minerals including oil and gas which precluded 
such coexistence. Public Law 585, enacted August 13, 
1954, met this situation by prescribing that mining loca-
tions did not carry rights as to leasing act minerals. It 
also provided a method by which mining claims, which 
lacked validity because they embraced lands within an 
application for or issued permit or lease under the Min-
eral Leasing Act, could be validated. Plaintiffs did what 
was necessary to obtain this validating benefit. Defend-
ants did not. 
Defendants state (Resp. Br. 36-37) that a discovery 
after location relates back to the date of the location and 
validates the claim ''if there have been no intervening 
rights.'' 
The United States Supreme Court does not agree 
with that assertion. 
''In practice, discovery usually precedes lo-
cation, and the statute treats it as the initial act 
but in the absence of an intervening right it is no 
objection that the usual and statutory order is re-
versed. In such a case the location becomes 
effective from the date of discovery;· but in the 
presence of an intervening right it must remain of 
no effect. (Citing authorities) '' Cole Y. Ralph, 252 
U. S. 286, 296; 40 S. Ct. 321, 326 (1920). 
Defendants blandly state that the rights of an applicant 
for nn oil and gas lease and a lessee under an oil and gas 
lease do not constitute intervening rights. How complete 
is the error of this unfounded and unsupported assertion 
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appears not only from the above referred to Interior De-
partment decisions but also from the following court 
cases. 
In Griffith et al. v. Noonan et al., 133 P. 2d 375, 376 
(1943), the Supreme Court of Wyoming said: 
''Counsel for appellants have cited us to var-
ious decisions of the United States Land Depart-
ment, for instance, Joseph E. McClory, 50 L.D. 
623, where it was held that the granting of an oil 
and gas prospecting permit precludes, as long as 
the permit is in force, the appropriation of the 
land for metalliferous minerals under the United 
States mining laws. That, too, was held in Filtrol 
Company v. Brittan &; Eckart, 51 L. D. 649. The 
correctness of these decisions may be conceded, 
but the question herein is as to whether or not the 
oil and gas prospecting permit above mentioned 
was in force on May 17, 1939. '' 
The court held, as had the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office, that the permit in question had ''expired by 
operation of law on December 31, 1938. '' 
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Wyo-
ming court said in Norris et al. v. United Mineral Prod-
ucts Co. et al., 158 P. 2d 679, 683 (1945): 
''Trial of the cause was to the Court without 
a jury and a judgment was entered which may be 
briefly summarized as follows : The Court found 
that due to the fact that the Blakeman Oil and 
Gas Permit, mentioned above as applied for Au-
gust 31, 1934, allowed April 9, 1936, and cancelled 
September 9, 1939, was outstanding upon the lands 
in controversy during that period and conse-
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quently these lands 'were not subject to location or 
, entry under the mining laws of the United 
States'; • * *" 
In Hagerma;n et al. v. Thompson et al., 235 P. 2d 750, 
753 (Wyo. 1951), it is stated: 
"At that time, however, these lands were in-
cluded in an oil and gas prospector's permit held 
by one Walter F. Tracy, so it is admitted herein 
that the location made at that time was void. Grif-
fithv. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395,133 P. 2d 375." 
Numerous types of withdrawals and reservations 
preclude Jhining locations. Numerous types of entries un-
der public land laws preclude mining locations. Prior to 
Public Law 585, an application for or issuance of a permit 
or lease under the Mineral Leasing Act precluded mining 
locations. Defendants complain (Resp. Br. 38): 
"If the Plaintiffs can prevail on their theory" 
(that a valid mining claim cannot be located on 
land closed to location by reason of the filing of an 
application for or issuance of a permit or lease 
under the Mineral Leasing Act) ''a locator of 
mining claims would have to make frequent cur-
rent checks in the District Land Office of the 
Bureau of Land :Management to determine 
whether there was an oil and gas lease application 
covering this particular land. If an application . 
. had been filed on the land, they would then have 
to make a daily check to determine whether the oil-
gas application had been accepted and then 
attempt to determine what else need be done to 
hold his claim.'' 
The same could be said with respect to withdrawals or 
reRcrYations or reYocations or modifications of with-
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drawal or reservation orders or of other entries. There is 
nothing new in the proposition that~ valid mining claim 
may not be made on public lands which are not open to 
location. The fact is and has always been that the status 
of the body of public lands in this respect varies from 
time to time and from day to day. The United States 
District Land Offices have always been the source of 
information as to what lands are and what lands are not 
subject to location. Any mining locator who does not 
care to gamble on the question of whether his mining lo-
cation is or is not valid must determine that the status of 
the lands upon which his claim is situated w~ not such 
as to defeat his location. 
II 
PLAINTIFFS PROVED THE VALIDITY OF 
THEIR RED CANYON NO. 6 AND NO. 9 
CLAIMS 
Not once but three times (Resp. Br. pp. 3, 39, 50) 
defendants state that plaintiffs have '' abondoned'' all of 
their claims except the Red Canyon Nos. 6 and 9. The 
multiplication of this misstatement does not change its 
character. Plaintiffs have ''abandoned'' no claim. They 
have simply and candidly stated (Appts. Br. p. 2) to the 
Court that they proved discovery on only two of their 
claims: Red Canyon Nos. 6 and 9. Plaintiffs assert that 
defendants have not proved validity of any of defendants' 
claims. There is no foundation in the record in this case 
for holding valid any of the claims involved (either plain-
tiffs' or defendants') except plaintiffs' Red Canyon Nos. 
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6 and 9. The remainder of the area, so far as the record is 
concerned, is still subject to the acquisition of rights 
under the Mining Laws but no location heretofore or 
hereafter made thereon can be valid and effective unless 
and until it is supported by discovery. 
Defendants assert (Resp. Br. p. 39) that plaintiffs 
''failed to show any discovery of ore by themselves.'' 
This contention has unequivocally been answered in 
Pitcher et aL v. Jones et al., 71 Utah 453, 267 P. 184, 186, 
where this Court held: 
''Nor is it essential that the locator of a min-
ing claim should be the first discoverer of a vein 
or lode in order to make a valid location, and if it 
appears that the locator knew at the time of mak-
ing his location that there had been a discovery of 
a vein or lode within the limits of his location, he 
may base his location upon it and thus avoid the 
necessity of making a discovery for himself. 18 
R. C. L. 1122; 40 C. J. 785.'' 
Plaintiffs rely upon the discoveries made by the AEC 
in its drilling program and upon plaintiffs' acquisition 
of knowledge of these discoveries through observation of 
the cores brought to the surface and left beside the drill 
holes and through recognition of the ore contained in 
these cores. 
Hyrum B. Wood, an AEC geologist, testified that 
drill hole No. 78, which is on the Red Canyon No.6 (Exh. 
P -97), was bottomed September 2, 1953. The chemical 
analysis of this core showed ore ranging from .06 percent 
to .10 percent UsOs (R. 209-210). The AEC drilling pro-
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gram was in progress when plaintiffs' agents Andrews 
and Pasco first went upon the property (R. 247). The 
cuttings and cores from the drill holes were examined. 
Pasco, who holds a degree in geology from the University 
of Utah ( R. 85), testified that he examined cuttings and 
cores from drill holes on Red Canyon No. 6 and that 
such cuttings and cores showed mineralizaion (R. 110). 
Andrews also so testified (R. 253). The AEC had drilled 
a total of nine holes on Red Canyon No. 6 (Exh. P-97). 
Pasco was not only on plaintiffs' claims at the time the 
original locations were made but he was also there 
in November of 1953 (R. 117) and subsequently in May, 
1954, for the purpose of posting plaintiffs' Circular 7 
Notices of Lease Application. 
Drill hole No. 109 on the Red Canyon No. 9 was 
completed December 31, 1953. Pasco examined the core 
from that drill hole in May of 1954. This was an ''ore 
hole" -that is, one in which ore with a minimum con-
tent of .10 percent U 30s was found. The observed evi-
dences of mineralization of ore in these drill holes from 
the Shinarump formation were subsequently verified by 
the chemical analyses of the AEC. Discoveries on both 
plaintiffs' Red Canyon No. 6 and Red Canyon No. 9 
claims are clearly established. That these <li§~Qy.mies 
~-------....---·. 
were made by the AEC in the course of its drilling in no 
way preclUdes' adop#_~I.l g{these --d{s~®:.Ye-nes' b_y_plaintiffs 
c:::.__ . . ~-,-~·- ·" . -·· --. 
and, as· s~~-~ }I,e:re.~nabove, this Court in the Pitcher 
casein-terms so held. 
Defendants assert that plaintiffs had not spent any 
money exploring the claims located by them. This liti-
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gation was commenced May 22, 1955. Plaintiffs per-
formed over $1,100.00 worth of core drilling and bull-
dozer work as assessment work during the assessment 
year ended July 1, 1955 ( Exh. P -36, pp. 43-44, R. 354-7). 
Under a stipulation (R. 43-53) approved by the trial 
court May 11, 1956, it was agreed that defendants' oper-
ators, Mc-Farland and Hullinger, might proceed in accord-
ance with the lease of February 19, 1954; that the lessors' 
royalty would be impounded pending outcome of this liti-
gation; that work done by McFarland and Hullinger on 
the property should satisfy the applicable assessment 
work requirements as to plaintiffs' claims and as to de-
fendants' claims ; and that any development or discovery 
work thenceforth done by them would accrue to the bene-
fit of the party prevailing in this litigation. 
Incidentally, the only monies the defendant locators 
ever spent in exploration upon their claims, either above 
or below the ground, were the fees they paid to Davis 
and others in seeking, shortly before the trial, to establish 
that the "sandstone lens" was a "discovery." After the 
AEC had made discoveries on the Red Canyon X os. 6 and 
9 (discoveries which cannot give validity to defendants' 
claims- this not because the AEC made them but for 
reasons elsewhere in this and in Appellants' Opening 
Brief set out), the defendant operators, McFarland and 
TTullinger, drifted into the channel which the AEC drill-
ing had disclosed. This they did with knowledge of plain-
tiffs' claims, and prior to the above-mentioned stipulation, 
in gambling disregard of plaintiffs' claims. 
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Neither the defendant locators nor the defendant op-
erators ever evidenced the slightest interest in the ''sand-
stone lens'' other than as they sought to claim it as a 
blanket discovery in an attempt to breathe life into de-
fendants' invalid locations. 
Defendants attempt to make much of an unsupported 
assertion (Resp. Br. 40-41) that plaintiffs moved or 
''floated'' the plaintiffs' Red Canyon No. 9 claim. Plain-
tiffs did no such thing. There was an error in the descrip-
tion in the recorded original Notice of Location of this 
claim. The law is clearly established to the effect that 
where there is a discrepancy between the description 
written into the Notice and the actual monuments on the 
ground, the latter prevail. Moreover, an amended Notice 
of Location was posted on said claim on October 3, 1953, 
sixteen days after the recording of the original Notice 
on September 17, 1953. In this Amended Notice, which 
was recorded October 26, 1953, the description of the 
original Notice was corrected and made more certain. 
This is one of the clearly recognized purposes of amend-
ment. Even had the position of the claim lines been 
altered (and this was not the case although the law like-
wise clearly recognizes this as permissable and proper 
through amendment) the only effect would have been 
that as to any newly included area, the rights would date 
from the amendment. 
It matters not in the determination of this case wheth-
er plaintiffs' rights date from the original Notice of Loca-
tion; or from the October 3, 1953 amendment; or from 
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the Circular 7 Notice posted May 21, 1954; or from the 
amendment of September 25, 1954, made pursuant to 
Public Law 585 since there were no intervening rights. 
Defendants cannot prevail as to any location of theirs 
unless they can establish the validity of that location 
prior to July 24, 1953, by proof th~t they had a discovery 
on that location prior to July 24, 1953. 
The survey and other evidence shows conclusively 
that plaintiffs' Nos. 6 and 9 claims (and other claims) 
were monumented and marked on the ground in substan-
tial accordance with the October, 1953, amendments, the 
May 21, 1953, Circular 7 Notices and the September 7 
Notices and the September 25, 1954, amendments. The 
situs of plaintiffs' claims is and has been fixed. Refer-
ence by defendants to plaintiffs' No. 6 and 9 claims as 
''floating'' claims and as lacking fixed location is wholly 
unwarranted and absurd. 
The present situs of defendants' claims, however, 
does appear to be different than where originally staked. 
Shortly after plaintiffs' claims were staked, defendant 
Hall told plaintiff Rummel that the reason plaintiffs did 
not find the monuments of defendants' claims was that 
"they were down under the rim" ( R. 407). Although de-
fendant Hall testified (R. 458) that "I don't think I made 
quite that statement," it is significant that in November, 
1955, Erle F. Bielz gave a signed statement (Exh. P-78) 
that when he wa8 in the general area with Bailey and 
I-I all on .June 2 and 3, 1953, the claims which they staked 
were ''on the Shinarump rim under the heavy white 
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rim,'' which would place defendants' claims outside the 
conflict area and would explain why the other witnesses 
did not find them where they now appear. Later, and 
after defendant Hall flew to Colorado to see him, Bielz 
wrote a letter (Exh. D-79) to repudiate the statement he 
had first made. The fact remains that neither the wit-
ness Pasco (R. 114-115) nor the witness Andrews 
(R. 237) nor the witness W. G. Mathews, a surveyor work-
ing for the AEC (R. 358-361) nor the witness J. W. Smith, 
an AEC geologist (R. 872-875) found monuments of de-
fendants' claims in the conflict area although they did 
find the monuments of plaintiffs' claims. 
Hardly worthy of passing mention is defendants' 
suggestion (Resp. Br. 41-42) that plaintiffs' Red Canyon 
No. 9 claim is invalid because its discovery monument is 
located on defendants' Red Fry No. 1 claim. This sug-
gestion of invalidity is based upon defendants' conven-
ient assumption that this Court will decide in their favor 
an ultimate issue, i. e. the validity of the Red Fry No. 
1 claim. Moreover, it will be noted how defendants' slide 
from mention of the discovery monument in one sentence 
to a legal assertion in the next sentence and a following 
citation both having reference to actual discovery. Per-
haps they merely failed to recognize the distinction. 
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III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS INVALID BE-
CAUSE OF FRAUD. 
The error of the trial court in holding that plain-
tiffs could acquire no rights because their originally 
posted Notices of Location were dated prior to the post-
ing is discussed in Appellants' Opening Brief, pages 16 
through 21. 
Defendants' argument in this respect is replete with 
misstatements apparently intended to obscure the issues 
with prejudice. The dating of plaintiffs' original Notices 
of Location ahead of their posting was intended by plain-
tiffs' agents to protect the claims against the misconduct 
of others and not to defraud or injure anyone. Admit-
tedly, this was bad judgment but no fraudulent motiYe 
was involved and the trial court so stated at the trial 
(lines 5-10, R. 427). 
In Stock v. Plunkett, 183 P. 657 (Cal., 1919), the court 
held that the claim of the first locator was valid against 
the subsequent locator with notice where the first loca-
tor's notice was undated though the statute required that 
it be dated. That holding is referred to with approval in 
lJiacDonald v. Jlidland Jliniug Co., 293 P. 2d 911 (Cal., 
1956). Inherent in an undated notice is a greater fraud 
potential than in a misdated notice, yet in Stock Y. 
Plunkett the amendment was held to relate back to the 
posting of the undated notice as against an intervening 
location. In the case at bar, there was no intervening 
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location between the misdated notices and the amend-
ments. The holding in Stock v. Plunkett is completely 
consistent with the statement of this Court in Muldoon 
et al. v. Brown et al., 21 Utah 121, 59 P. 720-721, quoted at 
page 19 of Appellants' Opening Brief. 
It is clear that the defendants were not defrauded 
nor in the slightest degree affected. Defendants repeat-
edly assert that plaintiffs when they located their claims 
knew about defendants' Red Fry Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 claims 
and Maybe Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 claims. The Notices of Location 
of defendants' said claims all bore date of April 2, 1953, 
and were all recorded April 17, 1953. Why, if plaintiffs 
were trying to predate defendants' claims, would they 
have selected a date more than four months subsequent 
to the recording of defendants' claims' 
Further illustrative of the misstatements made by 
defendants is the following: (Resp. Br. p. 45) 
"Another advantage that the Plaintiffs at-
tempted to gain by using this date was the pre-
dating of the issuance of the oil and gas lease 
which was dated September 1, 1953. '' 
There is not a word in the record to indicate that plain-
tiffs then had the slightest knowledge as to the oil and 
gas lease and, furthermore, the oil and gas lease had been 
applied for July 24, 1953, and was actually issued August 
7, 1953. The suggestion that an August 18, 1953 date 
was intended to predate the effect of that application or 
lease issuance is nonsense. 
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The Utah statutes contemplate that the corners of a 
mining claim will be monumented within the time allowed 
for recording of the Notice of Location. Defendants con-
cede that they did not mark the corners of their claims 
until June, 1953, a month and a half after defendants had 
recorded their Notices of Location. Were defendants 
seeking some improper advantage by recording the 
Notices of Location before the corners of their claims had 
been monumented ~ 
An Amended Notice of Location of plaintiffs' Red 
, Canyon No. 6 mining claim dated October 1, 1953, was 
posted that day. An Amended Notice of Location of plain-
tiffs' Red Canyon No. 9 mining claim dated October 3, 
1953, was posted that day. Timely recording was had as 
to each of these Amended Notices of Location and each of 
these Amended Notices of Location was sufficient stand-
ing on its own to constitute an original location. 
These amended relocations were, as were plaintiffs' 
original locations, then invalid because they covered land 
embraced within an oil and gas lease. Section 1 of Public 
Law 585 (30 USCA 521), enacted August 13, 1954, pro-
vided the means by which such invalid locations could be 
validated through the filing of amended notices of loca-
tion within the period allowed by the statute. This plain-
tiffs did on September 1. 1954. No such Amended Notices 
were filed by defendants as to their claims which were 
invalid for ]ack of discovery prior to the filing of the 
application pursuant to which said oil and gas lease was 
issued. 
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On February 10,1954, AEC Circular 7 (10 CFR 60.7) 
was promulgated through publication in the Federal 
Register. That Circular was designed to permit acquisi-
tion of uranium lease rights on lands whereon location of 
valid mining claims was precluded because of there being 
an outstanding lease or permit under the Mineral Leas-
ing Act or a pending application therefor. On May 21, 
1954, plaintiffs, in accordance with this Circular, posted 
Notices of Lease Application on their respective claim 
tracts. This was followed by a timely filing with AEC of 
plaintiffs' Lease Application No. O.G. 1021. Under the 
provisions of Section 3 of Public Law 585 (30 USCA 523) 
the owner of any pending uranium lease application was 
granted a preference right for a period of 120 days after 
the date of the enactment for the location of mining 
claims covering tracts as to which notices of lease appli-
cation and a lease application had been filed. The amended 
relocations made by plaintiffs September 1, 1954, com-
plied in every respect with the requirements necessary to 
entitle plaintiffs to the benefits of that Section 3. 
Even apart, however, from the question of whether 
plaintiffs' claims were validated under Section 1 of Pub-
lic Law 585 or whether they are preference right locations 
under Section 3 of Public Law 585, the provisions of 
Section 5 of Public Law 585 ( 30 USCA 525) opened to 
mining location as of August 13, 1954, those lands as to 
which mining location had theretofore been precluded 
because the lands were either: 
1. included in a permit or a lease issued under the 
mineral leasing laws ; or 
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2. covered by an application or offer for a permit 
or lease which had been filed under the mineral 
leasing laws ; or 
3. known to be valuable for minerals subject to 
disposition under the mineral leasing laws. 
The amended relocations made by plaintiffs September 1, 
1954, complied in all respects with the requirements 
necessary for the location of a valid mining claim and, if 
treated as effective only as of that date, stand as the first 
valid mining locations made as to the area in conflict. 
Since there were no intervening rights, it matters 
not whether by virtue of compliance with Section 1 of 
Public Law 585 plaintiffs' rights date from the posting of 
their original locations in September, 1953, or from the 
posting of their amended relocations in October, 1953, or 
whether by virtue of compliance with Section 3 of Public 
Law 585 plaintiffs' rights date from their posting of Cir-
cular 7 Notices of Lease Application on :May 21, 1954, or 
whether plaintiffs' amended relocations of September 1, 
1954, be treated as the first effective date of plaintiffs' 
rights. 
The gist of defendants' argument is that because 
plaintiffs made the mistake of predating their original 
Notices of Location there was nothing which they could 
do whereby the mistake could be eorrected and rights 
could be acquired. 
Any careful analysis of the cases relating to amend-
ment will show that as between (1) a situation where the 
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original but subsequently amended location was wholly 
invalid and (2) a situation where the original but subse-
quently amended location involved a merely technical 
irregularity or deficiency, there is this and only this 
distinction : Where the original location was wholly 
invalid, an amended relocation which meets the require-
ments of law operates from the date of the amended 
relocation and does not relate the thus established rights 
back to the date of the original location. On the other 
hand, where there was but a technical irregularity or de-
ficiency, the amendment is related back to the original 
location as establishing rights as of the date of the 
original location. 
Defendants boldly assert (Resp. Br. 47 -48) that a 
mining location which is void cannot be amended. Each 
of the three cases cited by defendants for this contention 
was a Colorado case involving two particular and appar-
ently conflicting Colorado statutory provisions, one of 
which declared a defective certificate to be void and the 
other of which authorized amendment. 
In Morrison's Min.ing Rights, 16th Edition, page 633, 
the author states in criticism of Sulliva;n et al. v. Sharp 
et al., 80 P. 1054 (Colo.), one of the three cases cited by 
defendants: 
''The op1n1on everywhere has always been 
that a relocation perfected the original location if 
in any respect defective, or, if void, the incident 
which rendered it void being at the time of reloca-
tion gone, it operated as an original location. The 
case of Strepy v. Stark, 7 Colo. 614, 620, 5 P. 111, 
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17 M. R. 28, so decides in terms. The doctrine that 
a relocation could not cure a location originally 
void is absolutely novel and contrary to all the 
cases which have approached the point. -Beals 
v. Cone, 27 Colo. 473, 62 P. 948, 83 Am. St. Rep. 
473, 20 M.R. 591; Tonopah & 8. L. M. Co. v. Tono-
pah M. Co., 125 F. 389, 390." 
The foregoing statement from Morrison was quoted with 
approval in Norris v. United Mineral Products Co., 158 P. 
2d 679, 687-8 (Wyo., 1945). 
In McEvoy v. Hyman, 25 F. 596 (1885) another of 
the three cases cited by defendants, the federal court for 
Colorado in effect attempted to read the word ''void'' out 
of one section of the Colorado statutes in reference to 
amendments where another section of the Colorado stat-
utes indicated that application of the doctrine of relation 
to the original notice was intended. The quotation from 
that case set out in Respondents' Brief (p. 48) must be 
read in connection with the omitted balance of the second 
quoted sentence, the sentence which follows and the 
full decision. So read, it is clear that the court held only 
that the use of the word ''void'' in one section of the 
Colorado statutes did not defeat the operation of the doe-
trine of relation and, therefore, that the amended location 
involved in that case did relate back to the original de-
fective location and did defeat any rights under the loca-
tion which had intervened. There is nothing in the case 
which warrants any inf~rence that an amended relocation 
may not be effectiYe as of the date of its making, even 
. though it will not relate back. 
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In Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th Ed. page 160, it 
is stated: 
"In Moyle v. Bullene, 7 Colo. App. 308, 44 P. 
69, the very tenable distinction is made that where 
the original location certificate was so 'defective 
as to absolutely fail to comply with the statutory 
requirements' it was void and the amended record 
would not relate back; but if the original paper 
was only lacking in technical detail the two should 
be construed as of the date of the first, and both 
construed together according to the doctrine of re-
lation. But in Frisholm v. Fitzgerald, 25 Colo. 290, 
53 P. 1109, where a record contained no reference 
at all to a natural object or permanent monument, 
and was not only constructively void for noncom-
pliance with the Congressional Act, but was de-
clared void in terms by the Colorado Statute, the 
relocation was held to relate back to the original 
record and to e.ut out an intervening title.'' 
Frisholm v. Fitzgerald, referred to in the above quota-
tion, is the third case relied upon by defendants. 
It may be mentioned that Morrison's Mining Rights, 
16th Ed. (1936) above referred to, was the work of Emilio 
D. DeSoto and Arthur R. Morrison, members of the Colo-
rado Bar. 
In Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 
106 P. 673 (Wyo., 1910), the court discussed the McEvoy 
and Frisholm cases above referred to and clearly recog-
nized that the principle that an amendment of an invalid 
location is effective from the making of the amendment 
whereas an amendment of a merely imperfect location 
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relates back to the original location and cuts off inter-
vening rights. This court stated ( p. 679) : 
''Therefore, if a proper construction of the 
statute, a question which we do not decide, would 
require the location notice to be posted at the dis-
covery shaft as distinguished from the point where 
the lode was first discovered upon the claim, there 
would be the same irregularity in both the Little 
Joe and Merry Christmas location, which, if suffi-
cient to invalidate either claim, would invalidate 
both, whereupon it would follow that the amended 
certificate of location of the original Little Joe 
would take effect as recorded before the existence 
of the intervening rights, thereby curing the only 
defect suggested by this record as to that 
location.'' 
There was no fraud or fraudulent intent which 
would render plaintiffs' original locations invalid. But 
even were the original Notices held invalid, there is no 
basis for the disregard of plaintiffs' October, 1953, 
Amended Notices of Location; or plaintiffs' ~lay, 1954, 
Notices of. Lease Application; or plaintiffs' September, 
1954, Amended Notices of Location. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be, reversed 
and this Court should enter a decree as requested in 
Appellants' Opening Brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THERALD N. JENSEN 
Price, Utah 
EUGENE H. MAST 
First National Bank Building 
Grand Junction, Colorado 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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